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Pref ace 
The role of law and administration of justice in imperial 
China seems to me to have been underestimated until recently. 
To be sure, it is not hard to find out such sayings as pointed out 
by Su Shih "I have read ten thousand books but never the penal 
code."D It is true that neither law nor the administration of justice 
ever statisfied the dilettantism of mandarins or intellectuals in 
traditional China. However, it is also true that it was absolutely 
impossible to maintain the highly centralized bureaucratic machine 
of the imperial state without laws and punishments, however indif-
ferent to those the intellectuals pretended to be. The calculability, 
predictability and stability of administration essential to the bu-
reaucratic state could be guaranteed only by means of regulations 
as the objective standards, and punishments to sanction their 
violation. In fact, this was recognized by Chinese administrators 
themselves as shown by the views in Ch'ing documents that "gov-
ernment officials have to stress tax collecting and administration 
of justice among various kinds of ofiicial businesses. Of these two, 
especially adminstration of justice is of particular importance."2) 
Or that "in my opinion, administration of justice is the most im-
portant among the various kinds of official businesses. Therefore, 
you, government officials must do your best to pass judgement 
impartially even in minor cases,3) such as household, marriage, Iand 
transactions, and assault, as well as in major cases."4) The reason 
these officials regarded the role of the administration of justice as 
important, or even most important, will be easily understood, if 
we recall Marc Bloch's remark that " How were men tried ? There 
is no better touchstone for a social system than this question."5) 
It would be no exaggregation to say that the judicial power is the 
keystone indicating the whereabouts and character of political 
power in each society. In imperial China, who held the judicial 
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power ? There is no doubt that it had from an early date been 
monopolized by the state. Imperial China was quite different from 
feaudal society, for example, where judicial powers were tremen-
dously fragmented. The question to be asked, therefore, is what 
characteristics can be seen in the administration of justice under 
a society like in China, where bureaucratic administration was 
highly developed. This report, of course although tentative, will 
focus on this question, especially at the level of centrl government 
in Ch'ing China. 
I. The Fundamental Character of the Administration of Justice 
in Imperial China 
1. Three Types of Administration of Justice 
In considering the characteristics of the administration of jus-
tice in imperial China, the following statement in Yorozu Oda's 
Shinkoku Gydseihd (The Administrative Law of Ch'ing China) is 
suggestive : 
In western continental countries, especially France, Germany 
and Austria, a separate administrative court still exists . . . This 
system originated in the historical circumstance that the adminis-
trative power had to be protected against the judicial power. Ac-
cordingly, in the countries lacking such a historical circumstance, 
as a ma,tter of course, 'there was no ne~ssity for this system. 
England is the most typical example. Ch'ing China is another. 
Because, in Ch'ing China, these two powers are interwoven, and 
there is no clear boundary between them. In this country, adminis-
trator and judge are one and the same. With respect to the lack 
of a boundary between these powers, Ch'ing China is similar to or 
more thoroughgoing than England.6) 
I am interested in the following two points made here : 
One is the statement that the administrative power had to be 
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protected against the judicial power. What does this mean ? If 
it said that the judicial power, on the contrary, has to be protected 
against the administrative power, it would not be so difficult for 
us, who are under the control of a so-called administrative state, 
to understand. This is because it is a well known fact that judicial 
independence, or the autonomy of judicial power has been under 
attack since the time of Leviathan on. Well, what were the char-
acteristics of the society where the administrative power had to 
be protected against the judicial power ? 
First, this type of society took the form of strict separation of 
powers. Concretely speaking, the administrative power fell into 
the hands of the monarch, while the judicial power was still held by 
other members of society who were called Stande (estates). Second, 
administrative power actually originated from the judicial power. 
It was not until the power of the monarch grew up that adminis-
trative power came into existence. Third, we should note that this 
power of administration which fell into the hands of the monarch 
was limited to the function of Polizei. In other words, the func-
tion of Justiz, which involved not only civil but also criminal law, 
was still in the hands of the societas civitas (political civil society) 
composed of Stande. It would be possible to say that, aside from 
the function of Polizei which was under the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court, the administration of justice under the civil 
and criminal law was being held in the hands of members of 
society. By the way, Montesque's famous theory of separation of 
powers, although very often misunderstood as a modernistic theory, 
can not be understood, unless ws take account of this historical 
background in western continental countries. Well, can we discover 
such phenomena as the antagonistic relation between both powers, 
or the distinction between judicial law and administrative law (or 
recht and gesetz) , or the appropriation of judicial power by the 
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members of society in the history of imperial China ? The answer 
is absolutely no. It is impossible to draw a clear line between 
these powers. Chinese law was essentially no more than admini-
strative regulation, including that of punishment, as is shown by 
the fact that in China there was no legal term corresponding to 
the term right, recht in western countries. The state apparatus, 
headed by the emperor, was extremely reluctant to delegate the 
judicial power to the members of society, as shown by the maxim 
"Life-and-death power is the prerogative of the Imperial Court." 
Another point in which I am interested is the statement that 
Ch,ing China resembles England in the sense of non-existence of 
categorical differentiation between judicial and administrative power. 
Of course, it is unlikely that the legal, political structure in these 
two countries was one and the same. Rather, I would say that 
the one is diametrically opposed to the , other so far as the rela-
tionship between judicial and administrative power is concerned. 
To be sure, the idea of the separation of powers was as unknown 
to England, as it was unknown to China. However, what should be 
remembered here is the fact that in England, on the one hand, 
bureaucracy was extremely underdeveloped until the beginning of 
this century, and in China, on the other hand, it has been highly 
developed, since as early as the Ch'in period in the 3 rd century 
B. C. . What this fact indicates will be clear, if we take into con-
sideration that bureaucracy is the essential element for the admin-
istrative power. Just as Max Weber pointed out, in England, where 
the bureaucracy was primitive, the administrative power was 
therefore extremely underdeveloped, all administration operated 
like judicical procedure, in other words, it took the form of adju-
dication. On the other hand, in China, where all kinds of functions 
were dealt with through the bureaucratic mechanism, all adjudic-
ation took the character of administration.7) This is a perfect 
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example of the adage that " two extremes meet." 
In short, it seems to me to be possible to set up three types 
of administration of justice by taking notice of the relationship 
between judicial and administrative power. One is the type exem-
plified by continental countries. This type is characterized by the 
separation of the two powers. Second is the type exemplified by 
England. In this type, there was originally no separation of powers 
because administrative power was assimilated into the judicial 
power. The type exemplified by China was quite different from 
both of these. In China, there was neither the separation of powers 
nor the rule of law. We can characterize the Chinese type of 
administration of justice as that in which the judicial power, to 
the contrary, was assimilated into the administrative power. 
2. Administrative Character of Chinese Administration of Jus-
tice. 
My goal in this part is to make clear some concrete charac-
teristics of the Chinese administration of justice, as analyzed above. 
In order to do so, as a matter of course, it would seem to be 
necessary to take notice of the crucial differences between judicial 
and administrative function. But this is not so easy to China's case. 
So I would say in advance that the following argument is very 
tentative. 
In the first place, one of distinctions between these functions 
can be seen in how the decision making is done. As is well known, 
one outstanding characseristic of judicial functions exercised in 
the court is the fact that the work of a judge is essentially inde-
pendent, and no one can give him orders or instructions as to the 
manner in which he is to perform his work. In this respect, the 
work of an administrator presents a sharp contrast to that of judge. 
Even in his decision of the matters delegated to him, an adminis-
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trator is expected to consult with higher level's authority, and 
to receive instructions as to the work to be done, and the manner 
in whicn it is to be performed, and moreover to subordinate his 
decisions to the orders from above. In other words, any adminis-
trative decisions are, in theory, made through a whole long chain 
of administrative organizations from lower to higher and finally 
to the supreme level. To be sure, judicial decisions also take the 
form of a hierarchical appellate system. But this system is 
decisively different from the administrative hierarchy in the point 
that in judicial hierarchy each link in the chain of courts is an 
autonomous unit free to do its own work in its own way.8) 
Judging from this point of view, Chinese administration of 
justice undoubtedly belonged to the category of the administration. 
This is illustrated by the hierarchical judicial system in China. 
According to Chinese judicial system, jurisdiction over cases was 
delegated to the courts of the various levels in accordance with 
the gravity of the punishment assigned in the Code to the crime 
charged. Punishments were basically classified into five degrees, 
i.e. Iight bambooing, heavy bambooing, penal servitude, exile and 
the death penalty. In Ch'ing China, for example, the system was 
as followed : 
Category of punishment Level of jurisdiction 
. Light and Heavy Bambooing Magistrate .................... 
. . . . . . . Penal Servitude (except for the case Governer or. . . . . .  . .  . .  
of homicide) Governer General 
Board of Punishments. . . . . . Exile and Penal Servitude concerning 
to the case of homicide 
Emperor ........................ Death Penalty 
Curiously, while Chinese rulers did not pay much attention to 
sophisticate the appellate system, they endeavoured to sophisticate 
other systems such as the drafting which was called -/~Ei~~ ting ni, 
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or the ex post facto report which was called ~~1~ hui pao, ~~! 
hui t'i, or relegation to higher authority which was, for example, 
called ~c~~~1S~: tze ch'ing pu shi. Of these, the drafting system 
was that in which drafting of decisions was, on the one hand, 
delegated to lower levels' officials, but the power of final decision 
was, on the other hand, kept in the hands of higher level's author-
ities according to the importance of cases. The ex post facto report 
was that whenever the judicial official had passed judgement, he 
had to report that judgement in detail at fixed interval to higher 
level' authorities. Under this system, as a matter of course, there 
existed not only the possibility but also the reality that his judge-
ment be overruled by the higher authorities, if they found his 
judgement to be false or inappropriate. Besides these duties, the 
judicial official was also faced with the cases where he was less 
confident of how to judge. In those cases, he was authorized to 
resort to the relegation to higher authorities. It is clear that all 
of those systems aimed at checking the arbitrary judgement. And, 
at the same time, it is also true that in decision-making the official 
regarded himslf as bound to receive the instructions or the orders 
as to the legal case to be decided, or to subordinate his decision to 
the orders from above. In other words, it was expected that any 
decisions were made through a long chain of administrative hier-
archy, and there was, therfore, no autonomy in each judicial unit. 
In the second place, the difference between both functions can 
be also seen in the relative force of decisions. Whether the decision, 
once pronounced, is irrevocable or not is the decisive point which 
distinguishes the one from another. As is well known, one of the 
main characteristics of the judicial function as exercised in the 
court is that the decision of the court shall finally determine the 
matter. And we can say that this characteristic results from the 
demand for legal stability which is indispensable for the admini-
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stration of justice.9) 
In this respect, the decisions of Chinese courts did not have 
the character of res judicata. It is not difiicult to find many 
cases where decisions, even if once pronounced, were modified or 
overruled by higher authorities. This is closely related to the 
report system metioned above. And, interestingly, this phenomenon 
extended even to the emperor's decision, which should in theory 
have been the supreme or final decision. We can sometimes find 
cases where he afterwards reversed the decision made by himself. 
In so far as Chinese administration of justice is concerned, it was 
under the principle of "Never too late to mend" which is sharply 
opposed to the formal rationalism underlying the idea of final 
judgement. 
Well, why was there no finality of decisions in Chinese courts. 
The reason, after all, seems to me to be that it was not a judicial 
but an administrative decision. What is most emphasized in the 
execution of administrative business is such matters as expediency, 
efficacy, utility, substantial rationality. And all of these matters 
are of a discretionary character. Since an administrative decision 
is made based upon discretionary considerations, it is necessary to 
retain the chance to review, modify or overrule such decision later. 
In the third place, the distinction between both functions can 
be seen in the point of whether the action is passive or self-moti-
vated. The passive action in judicature is typically shown by the 
rule that judge never decides anything unless the case is brought 
before him. Behind this rule, needless to say, is the underlying 
principle of a lis inter partes, a suit between parties. And this 
principle is tightly bound up with the other principle that the 
judge holds and should hold the position of a third party, aloof 
and impartial;o) 
Well, in this respect, too, Chinese administration of justice was 
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quite different. At first, although it seems to us to be very curious, 
it never had the character that the judge passes the judgement 
from the standpoint of an impartial third party to the parties 
who appealed to the court. This can be illustrated very well in 
the legal procedure. The chief tasks of the administration of 
justice in China were to investigate, arrest and prosecute the sus-
pect and to execute the punishment, while it completely lacked 
the stage of trial in the court which constitutes the essential part 
of administration of justice. That is to say, the administration of 
justice in China did not come to an end not until the suspect had 
confessed as the result of being forced to do so by means of torture. 
This means that Chinese administration of justice was, in it's func-
tion, no more than simple administration. Because all of these 
tasks, except for that of trial, are those which can be assigned to 
police or prosecutor. The Chinese official was nothing but an 
administrator. 
Since he was no more than an administrator, it was natural 
that neither the rule of "the case in hand " nor the principle of 
"a lis inter partes" was known to him. His chief concern was how 
to maintain the public security day by day, continuously, or how 
to recover it as quickly as possible, or to determine what extent 
it was violated. What should be remembered here is the fact that 
he assumed unlimited responsibility for the results of violations 
against the public security. This means that he was very sensitive 
to the violations of the public security, and accordingly, that he 
was likely to ferret out and get rid of those violations as soon as 
possible. At the same time, it was also true that he was very 
reluctant to intervene criminal activity, unless those were, in his 
judgement, dangerous to the maintenance of the public security. 
Even though the victims brought the case before him, this was his 
attitude. That reason should be attributed to the characteristic of 
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administration that the administrator's action is not passive but 
self -motivated. 
Finally, the administrative character of Chinese judicature can 
be seen in the point that judicial officials placed their chief or only 
concern upon the matter of punishment, that is to say, the matter 
of what degree of punishment is most fitting to the legal case. 
On the other hand, curiously, we can hardly find any cases where 
the question of guilty or not guilty was the central point of issue. 
Why ? The reason is due to their way of thinking that, once the 
legal case was brought before them, one of the parties was as-
sumed to be guilty. On the assumption of guiltiness, what they 
concentrated their attention was the matter of which degree of 
punishment was most fitting to the case brought before them. 
And, what should be kept in mind here is that such a matter as 
execution of punishment is not an essential mark of the judicial 
function. As indicated above, the essence of the judicial function 
is to judge whether the party is guilty or not, or which party is 
the lawful subject based upon the result of the trial in the court. 
On the other hand, the judicial function has, by its nature, no 
concern with the matter of whether the legal case should be pros-
ecuted, or which degree of punishment should be inflicted on the 
case, or how the punishment should be executed. Those are mat-
ters which belong to the category of discretionary consideration 
or legislative or executive policy. In other words, those matters 
with which Chinese administration of justice was concerned exclu-
sively are familiar with the administrative function. We can not 
understand the reason why the administration of justice in China 
very often took the form of judicial legislation at the same time, 
unless we take account of the matters like these. This is because 
such legislation results from considerations of policy, and the lat-
ter is one of the characteristics of the administrative function. 
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II. Realities of Administration of Justice in Imperial China -
Chiefly in the Board of Punishments of Ch'ing China -
1. Issue Point 
As mentioned above, Chinese administration of justice can be 
characterized as the type in which adjudication was completely 
merged into the administrative function. On this point, I would 
agree with M. Weber's opinion. The problem is, however, his other 
assertion that adjudication in China was oriented toward substan-
tive rather than formal standards, and therefore, was a strongly 
irrational and ad hoc type of fireside equity, or "khadi justice."u) 
However, there is another view which is sharply opposed to his 
opinion. In the latter view, it is said that judicial officials in the 
central government who dealt with major cases, endeavoured to 
apply existing laws with great strictness, and paid as much atten-
tion as possible to the maintenance of legal stability and uniformity 
in rendering their decisions. Well, which opinion represents the 
reality of the Chinese administration of justice ? The Chinese 
administration of justice is undoubtedly a touchstone when we 
think about the characteristics of the third type of administration 
of justice, which is different from both the English and the Con-
tinental type. 
2. The Orientation Toward the Legal Stability in Rendering 
Decision 
To begin with, I would introduce the following observation : 
Anyone who has read the Hsin-an hui-lan, or conspectus of criminal 
cases recorded by the Board of Punishments, should have noticed 
that only one case;2) among more than 5,650 cases, was decided 
without making reference to or direct or indirect citation of the 
existing bodies of law. From this, we can say that the Chinese 
administration of justice, at least that at the level of the Board 
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of Punishments, was never arbitrary or irrational in the sense that 
the decisions were made without regard to existing laws. Rather, 
we have to recognize that the following provision was never a 
dead letter : "in rendering decisions, all judicial officials have, 
without exception, to make citation of Lti, the fundamental law 
(hereinafter referred to as the Law) , or Li, the supplementary law 
(hereinafter referred to as the Statute) ."I3) We will not be able to 
understand the reason why virtually all cases were decided in ac-
cordance with the law, unless we recognize that the Laws and 
Statutes had, in practice, binding force. Well, what gave rise to 
this binding force ? Of course, it can not have resulted from the 
idea of the rule of law, which existed only in the English model 
of administration of justice. It resulted simply from the strict 
administrative controls from above. What official could disregard 
the laws, given the threat of administrative or criminal sanctions 
enforced by the reporting system that obliged him to report to 
higher level' authorities both before and after his decision, or the 
threat of the system of periodic evaluation about administrative 
services to which he, as a member of the bureaucracy, was very 
s ensitive ? 
At the same time, what should be noticed here is that Chinese 
law in itself took a shape which made it extremely difficult to put 
discretionary considerations in decisions, although it is doubtful 
whether such considerations could be completely shut out. Because, 
as is often pointed out, the letter of Chinese Law was extremely 
specific about the types of individual crimes, and there was, there-
fore, Iittle or no room for flexible application or interpretation of 
law. Consequently, there is no doubt that, on the one hand, this 
specificity should guaranteed the predictability of decision-making. 
However, it is also true that, on the other hand, this specificity 
would present the judicial officials with certain difficulties. They 
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were very often faced with cases where there was no precisely 
applicable Law or Statute, or where, although applicable Law ex-
isted, it was found to be inappropriate in the light of the circum-
stances of the case. Of course, Chinese Law did not leave such 
situations out of consideration. Prepared for these cases, it laid 
down in advance such provision as " Doing what ought not to be 
done" which Bodde calls a "catch-all " statute,14) and also permitted 
the application of law by analogy. Since the principle of Nulla 
poena sine lege was unknown in China, such provisions were felt 
to be both permissible and necessary. And, of these provisions, 
especially the latter played a very important role because, being 
different from the so-called catch-all statute, which could only be 
applied in minor cases, analogy covered all kinds of cases of both 
major and minor. Therefore, this provision may give us the im-
pression that the judicial officials could decide cases at their whim. 
But, in practice, it was very difficult for them to make arbitrary 
decisions by means of these provisions, because cases so decided 
were, of course like all others, governed by the administrative 
controls and sanctions mentioned above. Especially in the case of 
the application of law by analogy, administrative control from 
above was surprisingly careful, as is shown by the provisions that 
"when . . . the Law or the Statute which is most closely applicable 
is cited, the Board of Punishments will then assemble the Three 
High Courts to deliberate and determine sentence. This sentence 
will then be submitted to the Throne with detailed explanation 
that inasmuch as the Code lacks a precisely applicable article, the 
present judgement is pronounced by analogy to a certain Law 
or Statute . . . . The imperial rescript will then be awaited and action 
taken accordingly."I5) Needless to say, administrative or criminal 
punishment was inflicted upon the official whose application of law 
by analogy was found in that process to be false or improper. 
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How did he, faced with these cases, try to search and determine 
the most fitting article to apply analogically. 
What must be remembered to this matter is that the source 
of law in rendering decisions was never limited to the Laws or 
the Statutes. Faced with such problems as which law was most 
closely applicable, or how the letter of the law should be inter-
pretated, or which degree of punishment was most fitting, they 
tried to cope by making reference to other kinds of legal sources. 
Those sources consisted of the Regulations (tse-li), General Circulars 
(t'ung hsing), Leading Cases (cheng-an) among cases already decid-
ed, official commentary (chi-chieh) and private commentary such 
as chi-chu or chien-shih. By the way, judicial officials' attitude 
toward the so-called customary law was extremely cool, at least 
at the level of the central government. 
Well, what seems to me to have played the dominant role in 
the process of decision making among those legal sources is the 
leading case. Any one who has once studied the Hsin-an hui-1an 
should recognize how often the officials of the Punishment Board 
made reference to it. Suggetive in this respect is, for example, 
the following view shown by one official of the Board of Punish-
ments : 
In dealing with the legal cases, first of all, we should cite 
the Law or the Statute. If there is neither Law nor Statute 
to be applied, we shall search the leading case in recent years 
and make decision in accordance with it. Only when no lead-
ing case can be found we should resort to the application of 
law by analogy.16) 
This view shows us that, in spite of the provision thet "A 
leading case shall not be quoted as a precedent, unless it has been 
ordered to be circulated ",17) it was, in fact, regarded as the strong 
source of law as much as it took priority over the application of 
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law by analogy. One of the reasons why it was given high priority 
seems to be attributed to the circumstance that it was not so easy 
to discern abstractly which law was most closely applicable to the 
unprovided case, without relying upon the leading case as a concrete 
standard. In fact, many cases were dealt in this manner : The 
judicial official, first, found a leading case similar to the case 
brought before him, then determined the applicable law through 
that leading case, and finally applied that law to his case by analogy. 
Moreover, another indication of the importance of the leading case 
is that its citation was not necessary limited to the cases not 
covered in the Laws and the Statutes. Even in cases where clearly 
applicable law existed, judicial officials endeavoured to cite a leading 
case in addition to such applicable law. Interestingly, there were 
more than a few cases, in which decisions were rejected or over-
ruled by higher authorities on the ground that those decisions were 
made without reference to applicable leading cases.18) This indi-
cates that it was the obligation of the judicial officials to make 
reference to the leading case without regard to whether applicable 
law existed or not. This can be well illustrated by one case where 
the officials of both the Directorate (t'ang kuan) and the Supervisory 
Department (ch'ing-li ssu) of the Board of Punishments were allotted 
administrative punishment because they did not try to examine an 
applicable leading case in detail, with the result that they mis-
judged.19) 
Why was so much importance attached to the leading case ? 
In my opinion, it is because the leading case played the vital role 
of maintenance of legal stability in the decision making process. 
First, as to cases where there existed no applicable laws, the lead-
ing case, because of it's concreteness, could offer an objective 
standard in handling the application of law by analogy, and con-
sequently guarantee the predictability of decision making. And 
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we can also say that as the leading case played the role of prece-
dent, so that it could guarantee consistency or uniformity among 
multiple decisions. Second, these functions in leading case were of 
importance even in cases where applicable law existed. As men-
tioned above, the letter of Chinese law was extremely specific, and 
there was, therefore, Iittle or no flexibility in the application or 
the interpretation of law. This would seem to ensure that there 
would be remained neither any doubts nor any difficulties in deci-
sion making, which would require only the automatic application 
or interpretation of clear-cut law. However, the reality was never 
so easy. Not a few cases were accompanied with difficulties such 
as, for example, which should be applied among two or more ap-
plicable provisions, or how the literal meaning of the text should 
be interpreted, even where the applicable provision was determined. 
Moreover, there were also cases where, although both the applicable 
provision an,d the literal meaning were clear-cut, Iiteral application 
would result in inappropriate punishment in the light of the par-
ticular circumstance of the case. And, in these cases, too, the 
leading cases were very often cited or made reference in order to 
re-affirm, determine the applicable law, or to make clear the literal 
meaning of the applicable law. It is simply because the functions 
inherent in leading case, which offered the objective, concrete 
standard, and als'o guaranteed consitency among multiple decisions, 
satisfied judicial official' orientation toward the legal stability in 
rendering decision. 
3. Limitation of Legalism. 
As was described in the Ist chapter, both the idea of separa-
tion of powers and that of judicial independence were quite un-
known to Cnina. Since these ideas came into existence in societies 
where the political regime took the pluralistic structure of Stande, 
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it was natural that these were unknown to imperial China where 
all government was exclusively concentrated in the bureaucratic 
state headed by the emperor. However, this never meant that 
Chinese rulers did not stress the role of law. Rather, as is shown 
by the ideology of "Legalism" or the system of remarkably sophis-
ticated, consistent written code, Iaw was of decisive importance 
for the bureaucratic administration in imperial China. Without rule 
by law, the bureaucratic administration could not have functioned 
even for a day. This applied in the administration of justice as 
a link of administration, too. 
Not only in theory, but also in practice, judicial ofiicials in 
China endeavoured to apply the law as strictly as possible. This 
shows us that the concept of strict application of law itself was 
possible even in a society where there was no idea of judicial 
independence. However, what should be kept in mind is that in 
China the predictability and the stability of decision-making, based 
upon the strict application of law, could be guaranteed only by 
means of administrative controls such as the report system and 
the drafting system, under which the lower level' officials were 
always supervised by higher authorities. The first question to be 
asked is, therefore, whether it was possible to control the supreme 
authority who held the administrative controls in his hands. Being 
different from the judicial decision, in which no one can give a 
judge instructions or orders as to his work, administrative decision 
is made through the hierarchichal links of the administrative mech-
anism, from lower to higher levels and finally to the supreme 
authority. And the power of the final decision is, at least in theory, 
kept in the hands of this supreme authority, although in practice 
delegated to the various level' organizations according to the im-
portance of the particular case. If so, who can control this author-
ity who always has the power of the final decision in his hands ? 
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No one can do, at least, in theory. If it whould be possible to do 
such a thing, administrative order would become chaos. In this 
respect, the Chinese emperor was undoubtedly the supreme author-
ity of decision making, and anyone else could not control on his 
decision making. The problem is whether or not he was free from 
the restriction of existing bodies of law in his decision making. 
In this respect, too, he was free, as is clearly illustrated by the 
provrsron "extraordmary decrsrons are the nght of the ruler of 
men "20) or "(Imperial Majesty has a right of) carrying into effect 
as conformable to the exigency of the case in particular instances 
by announcing special edicts ".21) 
What can be pointed out from these legal expressions is : first, 
the imperial decrees or edicts in extraordinary decisions were, as 
a source of law, always superior to any other sources such as the 
Laws, the Statutes, the precedents and so on. Second, these ex-
traordinary decisions were very often accompanied by judicial 
legislation. This means that there was not a clear boundary between 
the judicial and the legislative act. Third, it was expressly permit-
ted in the code itself that the emperor could make decision in the 
light of discretionary considerations other than le*"al norm. When-
ever the emperor found it necessary to modify or ignore the fixed 
law in the light of policy, equity or some other substantial standard, 
he could execute the right of the extraordinary decisions lawfully. 
Of course, the theory is one thing, and the reality is another. 
To what extent he could, in fact, exercise this right of extraor-
dinary decision based upon discretionary considerations depended 
upon the power relationship between him and his subordinates, or 
upon the socio-political structure of power. What determines this 
is never the law but the real relationship of power between both. 
As to this point, I would introduce one interesting episode in 
Ritsury5 Integrated State (~:AT~ ~I~~) of Japan which was established 
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on the basis of the T'ang Code. In this case an edict issued by 
the Tenn~ (Japanese emperor) was rejected by subordinates on the 
ground that such an act was against the Law or Penal Code, while, 
according to the provision of Law described above, the act by the 
Tenn6 of issuing the edict should have been lawful. However, 
his act was rejected by the subordinates. Why was such rejection 
possible ? The reason was that the subordinates at that period, 
although they were bureaucrats in appearence, were aristocrats in 
essence who held independent military, financial, judiciary and other 
power. By the way, the feudal society of medieval Japan would 
not have come into existence without this socio-political structure 
of power in ancient Japan. In this respect, the subordinates in 
China were different. They were no more than the bureaucrats 
who were innocent of the selfish appropriation of administrative 
means. My conclusion is, therefore, that it was extremely difficult 
for bureaucrats to resist the execution of the right of extraordinary 
decision by the emperor, without running a risk of losing their 
ranking posts or even their lives. Not only in theory, but also in 
practice, the emperor made extraordinary decisions in the form of 
decrees or edicts without being restricted by any kinds of existing 
bodies of Law. This is illustrated by, for example, the origin of 
the Statutes which took priority over the Laws in point of force 
of legal source, and amounted, at last, to 1892 articles in number 
during Ch'ing China. These Statutes resulted from the extra-
ordinary decisions made by emperor. The development of Chinese 
Law completely depended upon the legal and political structure 
under which the emperor could and did execute the right of the 
extraordinary decision on the basis of discretionary considerations. 
Another limitation on the strict application of law or legalism 
in general lay in the ideology of law. One of the characteristics 
of the mode of thinking in traditional China was the lack of 
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formalism, in other words, the orientation towards substantialism. 
To be sure, it is impossible to completely exclude substantial values 
from judicial decision-making in any type of administcation of 
justice. This seems to be true even in the administration of 
justice based upon the principle of the rule of law. But, if we take 
notice of the relationship between the fixed rule and the substan-
tial values, we will find the difference between the administration 
of justice under the rule of law and that under the rule by law. 
In the former type of administration of justice, no judicial decision 
would be legitimatized unless the substantial values were dealt 
with at least facially within the framework of the fixed rule, how-
ever decisive in rendering decision the substantial values were. 
There seems to me to be no doubt that behind this attitude was 
the cult of legal formalism or formal rationalization.22) In this 
respect, the administration of justice in China was quite different. 
As was described above, Iegal formalism or the formalistic mode 
of thinking was unknown to imperial China. This is illustrated 
by the fact that there was no idea of finality of decisions, and that 
the idea of strict rules of evidence were unknown to Chinese of-
ficials. This leads us the supposition that the legitimacy of adju-
dication did not hang on decision within the framework of the 
fixed rule, in spite of the article of "Citation of the Laws or the 
Statutes in rendering decisions " or other. This is clear, because 
we can sometimes find cases where, in spite of the existence of 
clearly applicable law, other law was applied by analogy. 
As was described above, Chinese Law was extremely specific, 
so that judicial officials were often faced with cases not covered 
by statute. Therefore, we are likely to assume that the applica-
tion of law by analogy aimed at coping with those cases. Of 
course, this was true. However, its role was never limited to such 
cases. Judicial officials, in practice, resorted to the application of 
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law by analogy even in cases where there existed precisely appli-
cable laws, at least in our eyes.23) If we bring to mind that when-
ever judicial officials made mistakes in the application of law, they 
were subjected to criminal or administrative punishment, and 
especially in the case of the application of law by analogy they 
were under very strict control from above, it would seem to us 
to be hard to understand this free resort to analogy. But, curiously, 
they were not necessary sensitive to the strict application of law, 
in so far as the application of law by analogy was concerned. This 
means that the supreme value in rendering decisions did not lie in 
whether tlpe decision was made within the framework of the fixed 
law or not, but in other values. What were these other values ? 
In considering this question, one example provided for in the article 
of "Citation of analogy" is suggestive. The content of this example 
is that when a slave sets fire to his master's house, he shall suffer 
death by being strangled at the usual period, by comparison with 
the Law of "Abusive Language from a Slave to his Master."24) Of 
course, we must keep in mind that this article had less force of 
law than other legal sources, especially this example in this article 
had been a dead letter since the time when the official small com-
mentary regarding to this criminal act was afterward put in the 
Law of "Wilful and malicious Houseburning". Nevertheless, this 
example seems to be useful to us who try to examine the charac-
teristics of the legal mode of thinking underlying the application 
or the interpretation of law in China. In our eyes, it seems to be 
natural that this case should be decided under the Law of "House-
burning." While, in fact, officials were expected to apply analogical-
ly the Law of "Abusive language from a Slave to his Master " to 
this case. Why were they expected to do so, in spite of no simi-
larity, in the point of the criminal act, between house-burning and 
abusive language ? Supposedly, this is because what was most 
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stressed in this case was not whether the crimes were, in the point 
of the act, similar or not, but what social relationship obtained 
between parties, and, at the same time, which punishment was 
most fitting among those which were provided for in crimes of 
slave against his master. That is to say, the emphasis of this case 
was placed not on the act of house-burning, but on the status rela-
tionship between slave and master, and on the death by being 
strangled at usual period as the most appropriate punishment among 
various degrees of punishments provided for in the crimes between 
them. Judging from this example and other concrete cases, it is 
possible to say that the application of law by analogy functioned 
especially in the following two kinds of cases. One includes cases 
concerned with the Confucian order such as the mourning system 
or the most appropriate punishment was searched for in the light 
of the particular circumstances. In these cases, it was not neces-
sarily required to apply the fixed law, even if there existed a 
prcisely applicable law. In other words, the supreme standard in 
rendering decision was placed on the maintenance of the Confucian 
order of morality and the search for the appropriate punishment. 
And, clearly, these standards were never reconcile with lagal 
formalism or formalistic mode of thinking, for these standards had 
an inherently discretionary character, in the sense that a moral 
norm is always oriented toward substantial rationalism, and also 
that the matter of punishment belongs, by nature, to the category 
of policy. It would not be erroneous to .say that Chinese Law was 
essentially nothing more than a mere yardstick to meet discretionary 
standards such as the substantial value and the consideration of 
policy, or that the fixed law was likely to kneel to those discre-
tionary standards. Finally, I would point out that behind the fact 
that, except for a single case, all of the more than 5,650 cases in 
the Hsin-an hui-1an were decided upon the Lawe of the Statutes, 
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very often working the application of law by analogy in the 
of these discretionary standards. 
Notes 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
~~:~i~ To tell the truth quotation m this article as saymg that " I 
have read ten thousand books, but never the penal code " is not cor-
rect, although these words are often cited as the illustration of Chinese 
attitude toward the Law. True meaning is, on the contrary, that if 
they read ten thousand books, but never the penal code, even any 
wise rulers such as Yao and Shun could be at a loss what to govern. 
Huang Liu-hung ~i~7~C<~~*, Fu-hui Chuan-shu ~~~'~~~~f~~;, fan li JLi~I~. 
As to these minor cases, it has been said that they were usually 
adjudicated by individual units of social organization such as the tsu, 
the guild and the village, and government, too, encouraged such in-
formal settlement. However, it is necessary to notice that such policy 
of government was one thing' and reality was another. In spite of 
the encouragement of informal settlement, a great number of minor 
cases were, in fact, brought before the official courts. See, for example, 
following indications in Ch'ing period : "When I was the magistrate in 
this district, I dealt with more than 1,000 cases during less than two 
years." (Tai Chao-chia ~:~&~~, T'ien-t'ai chih-Itieh ~~A~$ ~~~~, ch. 7, kao-
shih ~~~;). Or "During my ten-month term of office, I decided more than 
1 360 cases " (Kao T mg yao ~;~~~~, Huan-yu chi-Lueh =~~~~~~~~~~~~, ~~J:)-
Or "People are eager to bring before the official courts not merely 
major but also minor cases. Supposedly, the number of those cases 
amounts to several hundred in some districts." (HO Ch'ang-1ing ~~~: 
~i, comp. Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien =~~ ~B{~~t~:~~~~;, ch. 93 hsmg 
cheng 4 ~f{J~~~~~, chih-yu ~~~~'-'~'-'~t). Of course, there still remains a question 
of to what extent these phenomena were universal. But, meanwhile, 
we should not disregard this reality. On this point, the following view 
is suggestive : "It is noteworthy to consider the psycological distance 
between the official court and people. It is my view in these several 
years that the lawsuits at the official court in Ch'ing China were much 
more closely related to the everyday life of people than the civil suits 
in present Japan are." (Shiga Shtiz6 j~~~~~EE~, Shindai no shih6 ni 
okeru hanketsu no seikaku ~~*f{~ ~ ~~~~tc ~~ k~ ~ ~fJ~~ ~) ~~~~, H6gaku Kyd-
kai Zasshi ~~~~~A~:~i~~~;, vol. 92-1, p. 62.) 
Li Yti ~~*~~:.., Tzu-chih hsin-shu j~~~~~~~:, ~~~, ~~[~, "'-'~"-'--~---":'~'-'--'~~~~~. 
Feudal Society, translated by L. Manyon (1961), p. 359. 
~~=~lf~~~t~ (1910), vol. 1, p, 133. 
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Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, pp. 854-
855. 
William Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, 3rd ed. (1951), 
pp. 43-46, 67-69. 
Robson, op. cit. pp. 82-87. 
Robson, op. cit. pp. 69-74. 
lbid., p. 855. 
The Hsin-an hui-lan (hereinafter HAHL. In this article, I used the 
reprint published in Taipei in 1968 by Ch'en-wen Publishing Co), Vol. 
2, pp. 928-929. 
13) Ch'ing Code, ch. 37, ~~f,f'-.~~ (Judgement and Prison), ~~1~~1~:AT' (Cita-
tion of statutes or ordinances in rendering decisions). In this article, 
I used Ta Ch'ing Lfi-Li tseng hsiu t'ung-tsuan chi-ch'eng ;~i~'r~~]IJi~~* 
Law in Imperial China (1967), p. 530. 
Ch'ing Code, ch. 5, the Statute added to the section of ~~?~1~~~~IE 
~~ (Determination of cases not provided for by any existing code 
provisions) . 
HAHL, Vol. 4, p. 1558. 
Ch'ing Code, ch. *Q7, article 3 of the Statute added to the section of 
~f~~~I~~AT1 
For example, HAHL, Vol. 7, pp. 3-906-3208; Vol. 4, pp, 1802-1804; Vol. 
5, pp. 1972-1974. 
HAHL, Vol. 6, pp. 2675-2676. 
T'ang Code, ~;i~l~, (General Principles) article 18, subcommentary 
of ~i~~~~~~~:~:~~~ the Ten Abominations and Collective Prosecution for 
Rebellion or Sedition. 
C11'ing Code, ch. 37, ~~~~l~~I~~A1~' 
It seems to me to be interesting to ask what the cult of legal 
formalism originated from. This formalism can be seen, for example, 
in the idea of res judicata and the idea of the strict legal procedure. 
There seem to be no doubt that these ideas were, in origin, closely 
related with the idea of Ordeal, Gottesurtheil in finding of fact and 
law. In this respect, it is interesting that we can not discover such 
an idea in the administration of justice in imperial China at all. This 
is because behind this indifference to the idea of Ordeal, in my 
opinion, was the underlying Confucianistic rationalism which was ori-
ented toward secular rationalism through and through. 
23) For example, HAHL, Vol. 5, pp. 2160-2161 ; Vol. 4, pp. 1541-1542 ; 
Ch'ing Code, ch. 28, ~:;~~~~~T~:~:~~Ji~i (Assault on Senior Relatives 
of the Third Degree of Mourning and Below, upper margin), in re 
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22) 
Chao mou-yin ~~~~~+~~~ case. By the way, as to the application of " Doing 
what ought not to be done", see, HAHL, Vol. 6, pp, 2480-2481. 
24) Ch'ing Code, ch. 38. 
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